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Pivoting to Russia, China and anti-Western rhetoric:  
South Africa’s foreign policy shifts 
 
President Jacob Zuma of South Africa and President 
Vladimir Putin of Russia attended China’s victory pa-
rade on 3 September 2015. The parade celebrated the 
70th anniversary of Japan’s surrender at the end of 
the Second World War. The leaders of the US, Japan 
and the UK said they would not attend because they 
were concerned about a show of military force at a 
time of regional tensions. 
Zuma’s visit reflected a broader shift in South Afri-
ca’s foreign policy in favour of China and Russia. The 
clear pivot towards China and Russia during Zuma’s 
presidency (2009-present) differs sharply from the 
more balanced multipolar approach under Nelson 
Mandela’s presidency (1994-1999).  
 
A Better Africa in a Better and Just World 
A discussion document by the ruling African National 
Congress (ANC), also reflects this shift.1 It formed the 
basis for foreign policy discussions at the ANC’s poli-
cymaking National General Council in mid-October 
2015. Such discussion documents are often an early 
indication of ANC policy directions in the next five 
years. 2  
The text of the discussion document on interna-
tional relations was drawn up by a panel of foreign 
policy heavyweights chaired by Deputy Minister in the 
Presidency, Obed Bapela, and including Zuma’s ex-
wife, African Union Commission Chairperson Nkosaza-
na Dlamini-Zuma; Minister of International Relations 
and Cooperation Maite Nkoana-Mashabane; Minister 
of Trade and Industry Rob Davies; former Director-
General of the National Intelligence Agency Billy Ma-
setlha; and former National Commission of Police 
Bhekokwakhe “Bheki” Cele.  
The document and related steps by the ANC gov-
ernment are covered under three themes: 
• How is the ANC looking towards China for sym-
bolic and economic leadership? 
                                                 
1 African National Congress NGC 2015 Discussion Documents 
can be viewed at  
http://www.anc.org.za/docs/umrabulo/2015/ngc_disc_docs
y.pdf. Chapter 7 of the document, from page 157 to 193, is 
entitled “International Relations”. 
2 The ANC held its mid-term National General Council (NGC) 
in October 2015.  The NGC is the ANC’s highest policymak-
ing body in between the quinquennial meetings of its Na-
tional Conference.  Ahead of the NGC meeting, various sub-
committees of the National Executive body have released 
discussion documents. 
• Which new deals with Russia have emerged on 
nuclear energy, arms trade and intelligence train-
ing? 
• Are there indicators that point to an anti-
Western bias and ideology, also regarding the US 
African Command? 
Due to political factionalism and economic policy fail-
ures, the ANC has become more reliant on foreign 
patrons. The shift in foreign policy also coincides with 
the shift to a hybrid regime under Zuma’s ANC. The 
locus of politics in South Africa has moved from ac-
countable democratic institutions to a field of power 
in which weakened democratic institutions and non-
democratic institutions interact.3 
 
Looking to China for symbolic and economic leader-
ship 
It appears that the ANC leadership views China’s 
communist rulers as an example. A Better Africa, the 
ANC policy discussion document, concludes: 
China [sic] economic development trajectory re-
mains a leading example of the triumph of humani-
ty over adversity.  The exemplary role of the collec-
tive leadership of the Communist Party of China in 
this regard should be a guiding lodestar of our own 
struggle.4 
Certainly, China is now South Africa’s top trade part-
ner with $21.9 billion, compared to $6 billion with the 
US, $4.7 billion with Japan, and $4.1 billion with the 
UK and Germany each.  According to Mills Soko,5 polit-
ical economist at the University of Cape Town’s Grad-
uate School of Business, the ANC government is treat-
ing China as a unique strategic partner: 
The government’s refusal to raise tariffs on cheap 
steel imports from China suggests that it will priori-
tise its relationship with China at the expense of 
domestic interests. 
Trade with China is important. However, trade with 
2000 companies from the European Union as a bloc 
remains the most important, valued at $28bn per 
year. The US comes third. Many countries also trade 
                                                 
3 For an analysis of the shift to a hybrid regime, see South 
African Monitor’s June 2015 report at http://sa-
monitor.com/reports. 
4 NGC Discussion Documents, op. cit., p. 161. 
5 http://mg.co.za/article/2015-08-22-sa-and-china-a-love-
founded-on-state-control. 
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profitably with China while remaining close to the US 
or the EU. 
Thus, South Africa’s foreign policy shift reflects a 
geopolitical and domestic political reorientation. De-
spite the country’s strong private sector, arguably, the 
ANC now sees Chinese state capitalism as its model for 
a developmental state. A “five- to ten-year strategic 
programme” between China and South Africa, signed 
during a visit to China by Zuma in 2014, laid out specif-
ic aims on cooperation on state-owned enterprises. 
Higher-level executives at South African state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) will be educated at the Chinese 
Academy of Governance in Beijing.6  
Already, many new ANC laws, bills and regulations 
to gain more government resources have affected or 
will affect water, coal, steel, minerals, agriculture and 
other economic sectors. Carol O’Brien, the director of 
the American Chamber of Commerce in South Africa, 
stated in February 2015 that the plethora of legislation 
coming out of South Africa is causing “jitters” in US 
businesses with operations based in the country.   
The ANC is also establishing a Political School and 
Policy Institute at Venterskroon in South Africa in 
cooperation with the Chinese Communist Party.7 The 
ANC government already signed a deal with the Chi-
nese government on cooperation related to internet 
infrastructure and cyber-security.8 
 
Regime sovereignty the priority 
How will these events impact South Africa’s political 
system? They occurred while Western powers widely 
criticize the Chinese record on political pluralism and 
its limiting of citizens’ access to “undesirable” news 
from the outside and social media.9 After protests in 
the Ukraine, Turkey and Venezuela, the UN Human 
Rights Council brought a resolution in 2014 to safe-
guard the right to peaceful protest. In March 2014, 
South Africa led a group including China, Russia and 
Saudi Arabia in proposing several amendments to 
dilute the resolution, prompting criticism from the UK 
representative in Geneva and from Human Rights 
Watch.10  
                                                 
6 http://mg.co.za/article/2015-08-22-sa-and-china-a-love-
founded-on-state-control. 
7 http://time.com/3601968/anc-south-africa-china-
communist-party/; 
http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2015/01/why-anc-
following-example-chinese-communist-party. 
8 http://www.cpifinancial.net/news/post/31624/south-africa-
and-china-sign-ict-plan. 
9 http://www.giga-
hamburg.de/de/publication/zivilgesellschaft-unter-druck-
globaler-widerstand-gegen-demokratie-wächst; 
http://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/news/media-made-in-
china. 
10 http://blog.unwatch.org/index.php/2014/04/01/shaky-
road-to-important-peaceful-protest-resolution/ 
Conditions for good democracy or criticisms of ANC 
policies formulated by Western powers, Western me-
dia or domestic opposition groups are often portrayed 
as neo-colonialist. Western “colonial” states are not 
interested in South Africa’s development, but rather 
want to take its natural resources and never give any-
thing back, Zuma told the Russian TV news channel RT 
in May 2015. Zuma believes things “would never be 
the same” with China, which has been heavily invest-
ing in Africa since the early 2000s, as the Chinese 
came to the continent “as equals.”  
Some NGOs claim that the Chinese government 
and the ANC government assist each other in obstruct-
ing or delaying the requests of critical NGOs to gain 
observer status at some UN structures for NGOs. 
These NGOs include Freedom Now, a US-based group 
supporting political prisoners of conscience, and Afri-
forum, a SA-based group supporting minority and civil 
rights.11  
On 25 November 2015, South Africa, along with 13 
other countries, including North Korea, Sudan, Syria, 
China, Russia and Zimbabwe, voted against the adop-
tion of the United Nations Declaration on Human Right 
Defenders. There were 117 votes in favour of the 
declaration, and 40 abstentions. It was argued that the 
resolution could be abused by leading Western na-
tions as a pretext for intervening in the domestic af-
fairs of developing countries.12 
The Zuma government apparently assisted Suda-
nese President Omar al-Bashir in escaping a warrant 
for his arrest from the International Criminal Court in 
June 2015. At the ANC’s NGC meeting in October 
2015, the NGC took the decision to ask the ANC gov-
ernment to begin the process of withdrawal of its 
membership of the ICC.13 Again, discrimination by the 
ICC and Western powers against African countries was 
argued to justify policies that could obstruct interna-
tional scrutiny of a government’s record on human 
rights.    
 
  
                                                 
11 http://mg.co.za/article/2015-08-13-diplomatic-fracas-
brews-over-ngo-freedom-now 
12 http://www.rdm.co.za/politics/2015/11/27/sa-votes-with-
russia-north-korea-and-syria-against-un-human-rights-
declaration 
13 http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/16/world/afric 
a/omar-hassan-al-bashir-sudan-south-africa.html?_r=0. Also 
see  
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/14/why-
south-africa-is-wrong-to-leave-the-international-criminal-
court and  
http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-10-26-op-ed-
how-africa-can-fix-the-international-criminal-
court/#.VjOQ8JqBfmQ. 
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Choosing Russia over “US-sponsored destabilisation” 
Both domestic and foreign considerations play a role 
in the ANC’s policy towards Russia. Business Day edi-
tor Peter Bruce speculated in 2013 that ANC’s financial 
troubles would probably result in the party returning 
to its dependence on foreign funders, especially 
among non-Western powers.14 In 2014, reports 
emerged that the ANC was broke. The ANC denied the 
reports. 15 
During the same period, news emerged of a myste-
rious, but major personal deal on a nuclear energy 
programme concluded in Russia between Presidents 
Putin and Zuma. The nuclear energy deal was in con-
trast with energy and economic policies, including the 
National Development Plan. Major departments in 
South Africa were not involved in the opaque deal, 
reputed to be worth up to $100 billion.16 Putin, a for-
mer KGB intelligence officer, used the opportunity to 
strengthen Russia’s policy to enhance its position in 
Africa and extend its influence in South Africa.17 When 
Zuma believed he had been poisoned in August 2014, 
it was to Russia that he allegedly went to get medical 
treatment.18 Tens of South Africa’s intelligence offi-
cials have also received training in Russia in recent 
years.19 
The ANC discussion document claims there is a 
concerted effort to destabilise Russia: 
The US does not appreciate the resurgence of China 
and Russia as dominant factors in the arena of in-
ternational power relations.  It has instead de-
clared a cold war against these two emerging 
world powers ...  Russia has not been spared the 
wrath of US-led Western imperialism.  As with Chi-
na, the Russian leadership is constantly being por-
trayed in the Western media and official discourse 
                                                 
14 http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2013 
/11/18/thick-end-of-the-wedge-zuma-is-pretty-well-
untouchable-politically. 
15 http://mg.co.za/article/2014-10-30-broke-anc-may-have-to-
cut-jobs-for-comrades; http://mg.co.za/article/2014-10-31-
anc-denies-it-is-broke. 
16. http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/08/14/uk-safrica-
nuclear-idUKKCN0QJ11T20150814; “Jacob Zuma’s secret 
nuke stitch-up”, Mail and Guardian, 26 September 2014; 
“Less Russia, more speed” (editorial), Financial Mail, 4 Sep-
tember 2014; “SA denies corruption in Russia’s nuclear 
deal”, Fin24, 1 October 2014.  For tensions involving the ex-
ecutives of the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation 
(NECSA) and alleged payments of NECSA funds to the ANC, 
see http://mg.co.za/article/2015-02-27-energy-minister-
shields-key-zuma-nuclear-ally. Also see Andrew Feinstein, 
After the Party: Corruption, the ANC and South Africa's Un-
certain Future (Verso 2010). 
17 http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/en/blogs/ 
africasource/russia-s-return-to-africa-an-update. 
18 http://www.iol.co.za/pretoria-news/opinion/reliance-on-
russia-goes-way-back-1.1903975. 
19 http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Spies-trained-
in-Russia-raise-double-agent-fears-20140831. 
as monsters abusing human rights.  As with China, 
counter revolutionary demonstrations and marches 
are being staged and given huge publicity in the 
Western media in order to destabilize and/provoke 
the Russian government ...  Whatever genuine con-
cerns may exist within the Russian population and 
populations of former Soviet Union, there is a clear 
plot to exploit this in order to contain the rise of 
Russia globally.  It is an encirclement strategy that 
seeks to isolate Russia in the manner that is being 
attempted on China as well … 
Washington’s sponsored destabilisation is not lim-
ited to Russia and China.  We see it unfolding in the 
streets of Latin America including in Venezuela 
which the US has strangely declared a threat to its 
‘national security’, in the Middle East and in African 
countries with the sole intention of toppling pro-
gressive democratically-elected governments.  This 
has a bearing on the nature of conflict and the 
scourge of terrorism we see in the world today.20 
 
Anti-US bias and the US African Command 
Other indicators of a strong anti-US attitude emerge 
periodically. In September 2014, Kebby Maphatsoe, 
the Deputy Minister of Defence and Veterans, called 
Public Protector Thuli Madonsela a CIA agent because 
of her continued investigation of the Nkandla scandal 
involving President Jacob Zuma. The US Ambassador 
was present and lodged an official complaint. 
Peter Fabricius of the Institute for Security Studies 
(ISS) commented: 
[A]t least [Maphatsoe] did new members of the 
diplomatic corps a favour … Many diplomats still 
arrive in the country under the naïve impression 
that they are coming to serve in the land of Man-
dela, a rather idyllic rainbow nation in love with it-
self and the entire world. Maphatsoe’s crude sug-
gestion … would have been a wake-up call, alerting 
them to the sort of ideological sentiment that still 
runs beneath the surface here, and sometimes 
emerges.21 
When the news broke in early June 2015 that the 
hosting of the FIFA World Cup in South Africa in 2010 
may have been obtained through a $10 million bribe 
to FIFA officials, a similar response emerged from ANC 
circles. Peter Bruce, senior journalist at Business Day, 
wrote: 
It’s just crazy for Sport Minister Fikile Mbalula, 
even by his own colourful standards, to insist be-
fore the media that the government did not pay a 
$10m bribe to Warner and, at the same time, chal-
                                                 
20 NGC Discussion Documents, op. cit., p. 162. 
21 http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/acronymia-nervosa-the-
cia-and-the-icc. 
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lenge the FBI to produce evidence that they did.  
What if the Americans oblige? 
The government’s defensive reaction seems at least 
partly motivated by an improbable conspiracy the-
ory that the arrests and warrants out for FIFA ex-
ecutives are an American plot to embarrass our 
new ally, President Vladimir Putin, and to take the 
shine off the FIFA World Cup in Russia in 2018, or to 
have the 2022 Qatar cup moved to the US. Mbalula 
sounded plausible at times addressing the media 
on Wednesday, but repeatedly spoiled the effect by 
drifting off into incoherent but presumably revolu-
tionary swirls at Imperialism. 
The anti-US position of the ANC has implications for 
the US Africa Command on the African continent, as is 
apparent from this excerpt from the NGC discussion 
document: 
The campaign to engage all [African Union] mem-
ber state [sic] on the continent not to host these 
military bases continue [sic]; however, the question 
that should be posed is whether this is still pre-
ventable because in certain places on the continent 
AFRICOM has already established its footprint in 
the form of training soldiers and other newly de-
vised mechanisms?  The ANC has to deal with these 
realities and develop new strategies to take this 
campaign forward.22 
In the document, the ANC leadership also reaffirms its 
ideological roots: 
The ANC is a revolutionary national liberation 
movement which is an integral part of the interna-
tional revolutionary movement to liberate humani-
ty from the bondage of imperialism and neo colo-
nialism.23 
 
Foreign patrons and factional agency 
Currently, the ANC’s foreign policy discourse is quite 
compatible with that of Russia or China. The ANC doc-
ument does not celebrate the fall of the Berlin Wall a 
quarter of a century ago. Instead, the ANC document 
actually laments “the sudden collapse of socialism in 
the world [that] altered completely the balance of 
forces in favour of imperialism.” This new imperialism 
has “plunged humanity in a perpetual socio-economic 
crisis,” and the United States stands accused of “effec-
tively using its aggressive foreign policy to advance its 
national interests.” 
As The Economist concludes in its review of the 
study of the ANC in exile by the prominent scholar in 
African Studies, Professor Stephen Ellis, 
                                                 
22  NGC Discussion Documents, op. cit., p. 176. 
23  Ibid., pp. 160, 185-186. 
The real message of Stephen Ellis’ history of the Af-
rican National Congress (ANC) in exile – painfully 
and palpably obvious between the lines – is how 
the conspiratorial past affects the ruling party to 
the present day.  It makes uncomfortable reading, 
for it goes some way towards explaining why Pres-
ident Jacob Zuma, a former head of the ANC’s intel-
ligence service in exile, and his comrades now run-
ning South Africa find it so hard to embrace the no-
tion that a diversity of opinion and tolerance of dis-
sent must be at the heart of any functioning, de-
cent democracy.24 
The tone of ANC statements on Western policies is 
largely critical.25  Often, this occurs to cover internal 
weakness and failures in governance, to compete with 
internal rivals or to find scapegoats. The factionalised 
ANC is now more reliant on Russia and China as for-
eign patrons. However, the agency of the ANC’s own 
factions should not be underestimated.  
Policymakers and bureaucrats will continue to try 
and improve the conditions of South African trade 
with China and Russia.26 Domestic political dynamics, 
rather than foreign alliances, will continue to drive 
many of the policies that shape the environment of 
foreign business and NGOs in South Africa. In future, 
the contests and realignment between political fac-
tions may periodically also generate different re-
sponses than the policy positions preferred by China 
and Russia.  
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